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Understanding Sovereignty 
and the US Constitution:  
A  View from the  
Massachusetts Ratifying  
Convention
Hannah Novotny
Eighteenth-century American politics does more 
than simply provide us with the U.S. Constitution. 
According to Gordon Wood (1991, 32), the stakes 
of eighteenth-century historical arguments are very 
high, as they deal with “nothing less than the kind 
of society we have been, or ought to become.” 
Barry Shain (1994, xiv) concurs with Wood, arguing 
that an understanding of the American founding 
“defines how Americans understand themselves 
as a historical people, as well as constraining what 
they might become.” As Wood and Shain indicate, 
an understanding of eighteenth-century American 
political thought shapes how we understand our past 
and informs the decisions we make about our future. 
Despite the consensus on the importance 
of our eighteenth-century political thinking, 
scholars continue to debate how these political 
principles should be understood. When considering 
the question of how we should understand the 
government created by the U.S. Constitution, 
scholars take a bifurcated view of what is called the 
federal/national question. This question concerns 
where sovereignty is located in the American political 
system. On one side, federalists maintain that 
sovereignty resides with the states (Van Tyne 1907; 
Berger 1987; Bennett 1942). For federalists, America 
is properly thought of in terms of citizens of sovereign 
states, independent of each other, who are linked 
together only by common interest. 
In opposition, nationalists maintain that the 
U.S. Constitution is grounded on a commitment to 
popular sovereignty. In other words, that sovereignty 
is located in the hands of the American people (Wood 
1977; Breen 1997; Ferguson 2000). Where nationalists 
disagree with one another is on the question of 
where America’s commitment to national, popular 
sovereignty comes from. Answers to this question 
include the following: 1) nationalism’s origins can 
be traced to our colonial experience (Wood 1998; 
Rossiter 1966), 2) nationalism developed between 
1776 and 1787 (Green 1986), 3) national sovereignty 
is a completion of the principles of the American 
Revolution (Diamond 1992), and 4) a consequence 
of decisions made by the particular delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention (Wolfe 1977; Onuf 1988; 
Jensen 1943; Roche 1961). 
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A third, hybrid approach attempts to reconcile 
the bifurcated positions on the federal/national 
question. Here, scholars contend that the ideological 
struggle between federalists and nationalists is 
between delegates from small and large states 
(Diamond 1992; Powell 1987; McDonald 1985). In 
making this argument, these scholars concur with 
James Madison in Federalist #39 that the Constitution 
is partly federal and partly national (#39: 199). In 
this understanding, delegates vest the people with the 
power of the ultimate principle sovereign but does not 
always give them a direct say in government. 
Despite their differences, all three bodies of 
scholarship share a common assumption: that the U.S. 
Constitution is informed by a coherent understanding 
of sovereignty. Mogg (2006) analyzes Madison’s, 
Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, 
and tests the assumption that there is a single, 
coherent understanding of sovereignty that informs 
the arguments and decisions of the delegates to the 
Convention. Employing a methodological approach 
where she constructs the political positions of each 
delegate over the course of the entire Convention, 
Mogg finds that the Constitution is informed by a 
single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty. Unlike 
the federalists, the nationalists, and the hybrid camp, 
Mogg demonstrates that the theory of sovereignty 
found at the Convention employs a conceptual 
distinction between principle and derived sovereignty. 
The first concept deals with the authority from which 
power is derived and Mogg (2006, 3) refers to this 
as principle sovereignty. The second concept deals 
with the exercise of power and is referred to as 
derived sovereignty (Mogg 2006, 3). The fact that 
delegates to the Convention employ two competing 
operationalizations of principle sovereignty explains, 
according to Mogg, why scholars have not been able 
to resolve the federal/national tension.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Mogg’s 
argument, it would be premature to conclude that the 
theory she identifies animates the American political 
system. This is the case for two reasons. First, her 
analysis focuses exclusively on Madison’s Notes. 
Bilder (2015, 3) concludes that the Notes constitute 
“one man’s view of the writing of a constitution...” 
and not an adequate account of the Constitution’s 
meaning. More importantly, Bilder argues that 
Madison only returned to the Notes in response to the 
specific challenges faced by the new government and 
the political ideas of Thomas Jefferson. Thus, not only 
did Madison revise his Notes more than previously 
thought, the documents were altered throughout the 
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entirety of his life with an eye to his evolving vision 
of republican government. One way to deal with 
the unreliability of Madison’s Notes is to focus on 
the reportedly more reliable Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 by Farrand (1937). Studies 
using this text are limited because they focus only 
on the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Drawing 
a distinction between original intent and original 
understanding, second, suggests that these studies 
focus exclusively on the topic of original intent which 
can be understood as the “meaning the Framers—
the delegates who drafted the document in 1787—
intended the Constitution to have” (Maggs 2009, 461). 
In contrast, original understanding can be understood 
as “what the persons who participated in the state 
ratifying conventions thought the Constitution 
meant” (Maggs 2009, 461). As potential sources 
for understanding the Constitution, James Madison 
suggests that original understanding is preferable 
to original intent. Speaking in the First Congress, 
Madison argues: 
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for
the body of men who formed our Constitution,
the sense of that body could never be regarded
as the oracular guide in expounding the
Constitution. As the instrument came from them
it was nothing more than the draft of a plan,
nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
were breathed into it by the voice of the people, 
speaking through the State Conventions. If we 
were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the 
instrument beyond the face of the instrument, 
we must look for it, not in the General 
Convention, which proposed, but in the State 
Conventions, which accepted and ratified the 
Constitution (quoted in Maggs 2009, 458-59).
Following Madison’s recommendation, this project 
tests for the presence of the theory of sovereignty 
found by Mogg (2006) in the Massachusetts State 
Ratifying Convention (1787-1788). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention and discusses 
the methodological approach used here in the analysis 
of the convention. Next, the third section presents 
the results for principle sovereignty and the fourth 
section provides the results for derived sovereignty. 
Here, Mogg’s conclusion of there being a single, 
multidimensional understanding of sovereignty 
across the Constitutional Convention of 1787 proves 
consistent with the analysis of the Massachusetts 
Ratifying Convention. Finally, this paper concludes 
by considering the implications of the conclusions 
presented here for how one should understand 
sovereignty and the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, 
the conclusion considers the implications of this study 
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for how one should understand American political 
thinking more generally and how one should approach 
the study of American political thought. 
The Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention and How 
to Study It
While conventional wisdom identifies the New York 
and Virginia Ratifying Conventions as the two keys 
to ratification of the Constitution, Massachusetts 
proves to be of critical importance as well. According 
to Pauline Maier (2011, 155), “If Massachusetts 
refused to ratify, other states—particularly New 
Hampshire and New York—would probably follow 
her example…if, however, Massachusetts ratified, 
the Constitution would be well on its way toward 
enactment.” The importance of Massachusetts for the 
prospects of ratification takes on greater significance 
when one considers the very real possibility that 
Massachusetts would not ratify the Constitution. 
With the divide between the delegates for and against 
the Constitution roughly equal, ratification was not 
a foregone conclusion as it was in Pennsylvania. 
Aware of their precarious position, proponents of the 
proposed Constitution had to work behind the scenes 
to make allies and reach compromises in order to 
ensure ratification. On this challenge, Maier (2011, 
158) observes that the Massachusetts proponents of
ratification, “faced a far greater challenge than their 
counterparts in Pennsylvania, who had a solid majority 
from the start of their convention. Massachusetts was 
a whole new game.” Thus, in addition to persuading 
fellow delegates via reasoned discourse, proponents 
also had to rely on political machinations and identify 
areas of compromise in an effort to turn opponents of 
ratification into proponents. 
Arguably the most important compromise 
of the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention was 
the introduction of amendments that would be 
recommended for consideration after ratification 
itself. In response to this suggestion, a number of 
delegates who were previously opposed to ratification 
changed their position and ultimately voted to ratify. 
For these delegates, the proposed amendments 
alleviated concerns that the grant of power to 
the national government under the Constitution 
threatened the security of the rights and liberties of 
the people. Though many proponents did not think 
that amendments were necessary, they embraced 
the idea and worked on getting John Hancock on 
board with the idea in order to ensure ratification. 
Hancock, the president of the Convention, was a 
necessary vote to the ratification process. Had he 
not supported the ratification or amendments, it is 
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possible that the Constitution would not have passed 
in Massachusetts. Maier (2011, 194) writes: “…the 
Federalists had to get Hancock on board…in a eulogy 
written after Hancock’s death, James Sullivan claimed 
that Hancock had reservations about the Constitution 
and, before the state ratifying convention had even 
assembled, drafted a set of amendments he planned 
to propose.” As demonstrated below, Hancock is an 
example of a delegate whose vote was swayed with 
the introduction of amendments to the Constitution, 
leading to the ultimate ratification of the Constitution 
in Massachusetts. A key to understanding Hancock’s 
change and the change of others is the distinction 
between principle and derived sovereignty identified 
by Mogg (2006) and tested here.
In looking at the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention, one is presented with two general 
approaches, and both are limited. A standard way to 
approach the study of the Constitutional Convention 
is to focus on issues of contention (see Rakove 
1987; Diamond 1992; McDonald 1985 & 2004; 
Powell 1987; Rossiter 1966; Wood 1998; Jilson 
1981 & 1988). This means that scholars focus on the 
understandings of ideas as proposed by the delegates. 
These scholars study these ideas to have a more 
robust understanding of the delegate’s positions on 
them. A consequence of this approach is to relegate 
the delegates to a position of secondary importance 
behind ideas. 
Another approach, one that recognizes the 
importance of the delegates, emphasizes the role 
played by political and commercial interests (see 
Jensen 1943; Onuf 1988; Morgan 1988; Wolfe 1977, 
Roche 1966; Beard 1935). For these scholars, the 
Constitution is best viewed as the means to securing 
personal aggrandizement and not a consequence of 
any overarching principles or ideas. At the state level, 
Van Beck Hall (1972) uses quantitative analysis to 
demonstrate that Massachusetts politics between 1780 
and 1791 are driven by socioeconomic influences. 
In particular, his analysis demonstrates that the split 
between Massachusetts’ coastal economic centers 
and its inland rural/agricultural regions explains 
Massachusetts’ politics generally, and that ratification 
of the Constitution can be viewed as affirmation 
of the belief that the Constitution would advance 
the commercial interests of the state’s commercial 
centers. The problem here is that this approach rejects 
the idea that ideas matter and only views political 
actors as being motivated by self-interest. While such 
an approach does explain a great deal of political 
behavior, it does not explain all political behavior.     
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In particular, it does not explain political decisions of 
monumental significance like ratification. 
What is needed instead is an approach that 
takes the individual delegates seriously as well as 
the importance of political ideas. Mogg does this by 
examining each of the arguments and reasoning for 
or against all issues that arise at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787. While she considers all issues 
that arise, Mogg looks specifically for insight into 
their position on sovereignty. This study follows 
the lead of Mogg and examines the delegates on 
all issues raised with special attention given to the 
indicators of sovereignty identified by Mogg (2006, 
7-12). For each delegate, I will take their respective
positions on sovereignty and create vignettes that 
bring together their statements over the course of 
the entire convention. Using the vignettes, I will 
classify the delegates based on (1) their positions 
on where principle sovereignty is located (people of 
the United States, people of the particular states, or 
the state governments) and, (2) their view of derived 
sovereignty (strong national government, strong 
national government in need of greater checks, and 
weak national government/strong state governments). 
The results of this analysis are presented in the next 
two sections of this paper.
Principle Sovereignty in the Massachusetts 
Ratifying Convention of 1788
Principle sovereignty refers to the authorization of 
government, where the principle sovereign authorizes 
the general government to hold certain powers and 
use them to secure the ends of government. The 
principle decides what powers its agent is given and 
determines the extent to which these powers may 
be exercised. It is the responsibility of the agent, 
who possesses derived sovereignty, to exercise these 
powers as instructed. Mogg’s (2006) analysis finds 
that principle sovereignty is operationalized in two 
ways at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. First, 
some delegates operationalize principle sovereignty 
at the national level and locate it in the hands of the 
American people. Whereas another group of delegates 
are also committed to the idea of popular sovereignty, 
but this group operationalizes principle sovereignty at 
the state level and places it in the hands of the people 
of the separate thirteen states.
The analysis in this section presents evidence 
which supports Mogg’s (2006) conclusion that 
principle sovereignty is operationalized in two, 
distinct ways. Of the thirty-six classifiable delegates 
in the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention, a strong 
majority (n=24) take the position that principle 
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sovereignty resides with the American people across 
all of the states without regard to state boundaries. 
Under this theory, there is one principle sovereign—
We the People of the United States. Three delegates 
believe that the Constitution is founded on the 
principle of popular sovereignty but locate principle 
sovereignty with the people acting separately within 
each of the thirteen states. Under this theory, the 
principle sovereign would be the people of the thirteen 
states, who would vote on ideas and then have the 
state governments present the results to the general 
government. The unique approach of this method 
allows power to be derived mediately or immediately 
from the people. Unlike Mogg, this study identifies 
six delegates who hold the position that the state 
governments possess principle sovereignty, meaning 
that the state would inform all decisions about the 
general government, and the people would only have a 
say in state matters. This third group of delegates hold 
the position that a confederation of states is preferable 
to the union proposed by the U.S. Constitution.1
Principle Sovereignty with the American People
Delegates committed to popular sovereignty and 
who locate principle sovereignty with the American 
people as a whole can be viewed as strong nationalists. 
For these delegates, the Constitution rejects the 
confederate structure of the Articles of Confederation 
and replaces it with a union form of government. 
Where the Continental Congress was the creation of 
thirteen sovereign states, the government created by 
the Constitution would rest on the authority of the 
American people acting as a whole. Delegates holding 
this position are located in the first column of 
Table One.
An example of this understanding of principle 
sovereignty is seen in a speech from Mr. T. Dawes of 
Boston. He says, “…as thirty thousand inhabitants 
will elect a representative, eight tenths of which 
electors perhaps are yeomen, and holders of farms, it 
will be their own faults if they are not represented by 
such men as will never permit the land to be injured 
by unnecessary taxes” (Kaminski 2000,1289). Here, 
Dawes understands that it is the people who are 
responsible for ensuring that they are represented in 
the House of Representatives by the right people. 
Thus, the failure of elected officials to abstain from 
the property of the people rests not with members 
of Congress, but with the American people who 
are responsible for holding their representatives 
accountable. Dr. Jarvis develops the reasoning of Mr. 
Dawes further when he argues “…that there is a very 
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Table One: Delegate Positions on Principle Sovereignty at the 







Mr. Sedgwick       Mr. Widgery*    Dr. Taylor Mr. Phillips 
Dr. Jarvis              Capt. Dench*               Judge Dana Mr. Davis 
Mr. Dalton            Mr. Randall*      Mr. Nason Mr. Bodman 
Mr. Gorham              Mr. White 
Mr. Parsons Mr. Barrell 



















*Delegates with an asterisk operationalize principles sovereignty at the state level.
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material distinction in the two cases; for, however 
possible it may be that this controlling authority may 
be abused, it by no means followed that Congress, 
in any situation, could strip the people of their right 
to a direct representation” (Kaminski 2000, 1220). 
Dr. Jarvis articulates his understanding of principle 
sovereignty when he says that the people have a right 
to direct representation. 
This understanding of the people as the 
principle sovereign is central to the understanding 
that the government created by the Constitution is a 
union and not a confederacy of states. In a union, the 
people are principle to the general government rather 
than the state governments being principle, as is seen 
in the confederate model. An example of rejecting 
the latter in favor of the former is seen when Mr. 
Bowdoin says, “But the advantages of a union of the 
states are not confined to mere safety from within or 
without. They extend not only to the welfare of each 
state, but even to the interest of each individual of the 
states” (Kaminski 2000, 1393). For Mr. Bowdoin, a 
union is preferable to a confederacy because of the 
greater security it provides the nation, the individual 
states, and every person. Under a confederation, the 
general government is prevented from acting on the 
individual as generally, the state governments possess 
this power.  Under the union model, both the general 
and state governments have the ability to act on the 
individual. Another example of the preference for 
union over confederacy is provided by Mr. Heath. 
He says, “Everything depends on our union. I know 
that some have supposed, that, although the union 
should be broken, particular states may retain their 
importance; but this cannot be. The strongest-nerved 
state, even the right arm, if separated from the body, 
must wither. If the great union be broken, our country, 
as a nation, perishes…” (Kaminski 2000, 1378). In 
this statement, Mr. Heath indicates that a union is 
necessary if America is going to continue as a country 
going forward. Implicitly recalling the troubled history 
of confederacies, he indicates that the states must 
give up the all principle sovereignty which they enjoy 
under the Articles of Confederation. If they do not, he 
fears that the nation will perish.
Principle Sovereignty with the People of the Thirteen 
States
Three delegates identified with an asterisk in Table 
One are committed to popular sovereignty, but 
operationalize principle sovereignty at the state level. 
In other words, whereas the nationalists operationalize 
principle sovereignty with the American people,
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these delegates operationalize principle sovereignty 
with the people of the states. For these three delegates, 
the relevant authorizing entity is the people of 
Massachusetts. This is consistent with the analysis 
of Mogg (2006). 
This understanding of principle sovereignty 
is evident, first, in Mr. Randall. He argues “Our 
manners, he said, were widely different from the 
Southern States; their elections were not so free and 
unbiased; therefore, if the states were consolidated, he 
thought it would introduce manners among us which 
would set us at continual variance” (Kaminski 2000, 
1303). Mr. Randall is concerned that the cultural 
differences between the north and the south, because 
of slavery, prevent the possibility of a truly national 
culture which he deems a necessary requirement for 
national, principle sovereignty to work. While he 
remains a proponent of locating principle sovereignty 
with the people, Mr. Randall contends that the 
people of the states would serve as a more effective 
principle because they would do a better job of 
protecting the rights of the people, given that public 
opinion on certain matters varies by state. This also 
speaks to his understanding of a union structure 
of government as he refers to the consolidation of 
states, which is used in a union. In his formulation of 
the relationship between the people and the general 
(national) government, the state’s function is to serve 
as a middle-man where the people of the states elect 
their representatives in the House (directly) and 
Senate (indirectly), with the state governments also 
involved in the assignment of senators as the middle-
man between the people of the state and the general 
government. He continues: 
Let us consider, sir, we are acting for the 
people, and for ages unborn; let us deal fairly 
and above board. Everyone comes here to 
discharge his duty to his constituents, and I 
hope none will be biased by the best orators; 
because we are not acting for ourselves. I think 
Congress ought to have power, such as is for 
the good of the nation… (Kaminski 2000, 
1244).
Randall views the responsibility of the delegates to the 
Massachusetts Convention as delegates of the people. 
Given the logic of the principle/agent relationship, this 
would make the people of Massachusetts the principle 
sovereign. Mr. Randall is largely concerned with 
diversity. According to him, the diversity of the nation 
undermines the ability to form a national sentiment 
of the will of the people. To this end, his analysis 
of diversity indicates that the best way to aggregate 
principle sovereignty is at the state level where there 
is a high enough level of homogeneity to facilitate the 
idea of the people. 
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Capt. Dench also falls into this camp with Mr. 
Randall stating, “…it had been observed, and he was 
not convinced that the observation was wrong, that the 
grant of the powers in this section would produce a 
consolidation of the states, and the moment it begins, 
a dissolution of the state governments commences. If 
mistaken, he wished to be set right” (Kaminski 2000, 
1338). Dench thinks that the state governments are 
necessary for proper government, but he is not exactly 
clear on how this applies to the current Constitution. 
Dench rejects the idea of a consolidation of states, 
which would unify each of the thirteen states under 
the general government, speaking to his understanding 
that a complete diversion from the states would 
be wrong. To this end, he is looking for some 
reconciliation between the potential abuses between 
both the union and confederacy, trying to find some 
structure in the middle that might remedy these issues. 
Initially, Dench is understood to identify the state 
governments as principle. This is arguably the result 
of a misunderstanding in definition of sovereignty and 
application thereof. It could be argued that, although 
he is concerned with the state governments, this does 
not mean that he views them as principle. Rather, 
he could simply understand that these bodies are 
necessary for government to function regardless of 
where sovereignty lies, though there is no direct proof 
of this understanding.
Principle Sovereignty with the State Governments
To this point of the analysis, the results presented here 
for the Massachusetts ratifying convention confirm 
the results of Mogg (2006) as principle sovereignty 
has been located with the people, but the people has 
been operationalized at both the national and state 
levels. A third understanding of principle sovereignty 
is found in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, 
but not found in Mogg. Here, three delegates take 
the position that principle sovereignty resides with 
the state governments. These delegates are identified 
in the second column of Table One. As mentioned 
in a previous footnote, Mogg is able to accumulate 
enough textual evidence to conclude that delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 who advocate 
for a confederate form of government actually 
operationalize principle sovereignty with the people of 
each individual state. In the absence of similar textual 
evidence, this study cannot draw the same conclusion. 
Thus, Dr. Taylor, Judge Dana, and Mr. Nason are 
classified here as locating principle sovereignty with 
the state governments. 
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Dr. Taylor says:
By the Articles of Confederation, annual 
elections are provided for, though we have 
additional securities in a right to recall any 
or all of our members from Congress, and 
a provision for rotation. In the proposed 
Constitution, there is no provision for 
rotation; we have no right by it to recall our 
delegates. In answer to the observations, that, 
by frequency of elections, good men will be 
excluded, I answer, if they behave well, it is 
probable they will be continued; but if they 
behave ill, how shall we remedy the evil 
(Kaminski 2000, 1185-1186)?
Dr. Taylor prefers the model of government proposed 
by the Articles of Confederation. This is seen in his 
understanding of a requirement for annual elections 
in contrast to the Constitution’s call for biennial 
elections in the House. This preference indicates his 
commitment to a confederacy of states rather than the 
union structure which is outlined in the Constitution. 
What he fails to account for is the ability to recall 
delegates who are working against the will of the 
people through re-election. 
Judge Dana is also in favor of a confederate 
structure of government. Similar to Dr. Taylor, he is 
concerned with representation, but he thinks that the 
Constitution will fail should there be anything but a 
confederate structure. He says: 
…if the Constitution under consideration 
was in fact what its opposers had often called 
it, a consolidation of the states, he should 
readily agree with that gentleman that the 
representation of the people was much too 
small; but this was a charge brought against it 
without any foundation in truth. So far from 
it, that it must be apparent to everyone, that 
the federal government springs out of, and can 
alone be brought into existence by, the state 
governments. Demolish the latter, and there is 
an end of the former (Kaminski 2000, 1238).
As Judge Dana understands it, there is no general 
government whatsoever without state governments 
retaining their full sovereign powers in a 
confederation. Here he identifies the state governments 
as the principle sovereign to the general government 
and identifies that the ends of government will come 
with a union structure. 
Mr. Nason was one of the few delegates to 
explicitly speak to his understanding of the state 
governments as principle. He says, “We are under 
oath: we have sworn that Massachusetts is a sovereign 
and independent state. How, then, can we vote for 
this Constitution, that destroys that sovereignty” 
(Kaminski 2000, 1397)? Mr. Nason is concerned that 
the general government will undermine the states’ 
power. He is a proponent of states as principle because 
he, and other delegates with the same understanding, 
do not think that the American people, in any capacity, 
have the ability to maintain the ends of government, 
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but rather that with this shift in principle, the general 
government will be destroyed. 
Derived Sovereignty in the Massachusetts’ 
Ratifying Convention of 1788
Derived sovereignty refers to the powers of the 
general government as authorized by the principle. 
This dimension outlines the powers which the general 
government holds as well as the extent of these 
powers. This topic, as seen in the Massachusetts 
Ratifying Convention, is widely contested and 
debated. Following Mogg (2006), it is possible to 
categorize delegates at state ratifying conventions as 
either supporting strong or weak derived sovereignty. 
The former are understood as those supporting a 
strong grant of power by the Constitution to the 
general government that is adequate for achieving the 
ends of government. The latter are those maintaining 
that the extent of derived sovereignty granted to 
the general government by the Constitution is too 
extensive and will ultimately undermine the ends of 
government. Given that the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention proposed amendments to the Constitution, 
it is necessary to provide a third category for derived 
sovereignty. This middle position holds that while the 
grant of derived sovereignty is adequate to achieve 
the ends of government, the Constitution does not 
adequately protect the rights and liberties of the 
people. Thus, further safeguards are necessary. The 




Table Two: Delegate Positions on Derived Sovereignty at the 









Mr. Sedgwick His Ex. John Hancock Mr. Widgery Mr. Davis 
Dr. Jarvis Mr. Barrell Dr. Taylor 
Mr. Dalton Mr. Turner Capt. Dench 
Mr. Gorham Mr. Cabot Mr. Randall 
Mr. Parsons Judge Dana Mr. Bodman 
Mr. King Mr. White 
Mr. Dawes Mr. Nason 
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Strong 
Delegates who believe in a strong derived sovereign 
are in favor of the general government holding 
more power. These delegates make up the majority 
of the delegates coded here (n=22). Based on the 
results of the previous section, these delegates also 
understand that the American people are the principle 
sovereign. Of the twenty-two delegates classified as 
holding the strong derived sovereignty position, only 
Mr. Phillips does not view the American people as 
principle sovereign, and this is because he cannot 
be classified on this dimension of sovereignty. The 
strong understanding of derived sovereignty thinks 
that it is necessary for the general government to 
have more power in order to better secure the ends 
of government. These delegates also have faith in the 
capacity of the American people to check the derived 
sovereignty exercised by elected officials. On the 
relationship between the people as principle sovereign 
and derived sovereignty, Mr. Gore of Boston says:
Some gentlemen suppose it is unsafe and 
unnecessary to vest the proposed government 
with authority to "lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts, and excises. Let us strip the subject 
of every thing that is foreign, and refrain from 
likening it with governments, which, in their 
nature and administration, have no affinity; 
and we shall soon see that it is not only safe, 
but indispensably necessary to our peace and 
dignity, to vest the Congress with the powers 
described in this section (Kaminski 2000, 
1300).
This is the main argument in favor of strong derived 
sovereignty: the general government needs to hold 
enough power to protect the will of the people 
effectively. If it does not have the necessary grant of 
power, as Mr. Gore and other delegates understand, 
the general government will fail. This is a huge 
concern among delegates, and they all take different 
views on how to best address the potential abuse of 
power. General Brooks says, “…when that power is 
given, with proper checks, the danger is at an end. 
When men are answerable, and within the reach of 
responsibility, they cannot forget that their political 
existence depends upon their good behavior” 
(Kaminski 2000, 1255). Representatives to the general 
government will not abuse their power, according to 
Gen. Brooks, because the people who elected them 
have the authority to remove them from office if
they do. 
Weak
The eight delegates classified as holding the position 
of weak derived sovereignty believe that the general 
government should have little power (or few powers). 
The delegates with an understanding of strong derived 
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sovereignty knew that the grant of power in the 
Constitution was extensive, but they thought it was 
necessary to the ends of government, and they thought 
that these powers were well-protected, so they were 
okay with granting them to the general government. 
These delegates view the grant of power to the general 
government proposed by the Constitution as a threat to 
the rights and liberties of the American people, as well 
as understanding that the derived sovereignty written 
into the Constitution was not sufficiently checked, so 
they worried about the general government abusing 
their power. Mr. Nason illustrates this belief in his 
praise of liberty. He says, “I beg the indulgence of 
this honorable body to permit me to make a short 
apostrophe to Liberty. O Liberty! thou greatest good! 
thou fairest property! with thee I wish to live — with 
thee I wish to die! Pardon me if I drop a tear on the 
peril to which she is exposed; I cannot, sir, see this 
brightest of jewels tarnished…” (Kaminski 2000, 
1397). Mr. Nason fears the loss of liberty will be a 
direct consequence of ratification. In the name of 
protecting liberty, Mr. Nason favors limiting the 
general government more than is provided by the 
Constitution. Similarly, Mr. Widgery worries that 
the power of taxation may be used to undermine the 
democratic foundation of America. He warns that the 
power to tax may be employed to restrict or possibly 
undermine totally the right to vote: “If Congress…
have this power of taxing directly, it will be in their 
power to enact a poll tax. Can gentlemen tell why they 
will not attempt it, and by this method make the poor 
pay as much as the rich” (Kaminski 2000, 1251). Mr. 
Widgery foresees a future where America transforms 
from a democracy into an aristocracy. This would 
remove the distinction between the United States and 
England and effectively undermine the American 
Revolution and its legacy. 
Middle
To this point, the results of the Massachusetts 
Ratifying Convention support the conclusions 
of Mogg (2006). The fact that amendments were 
recommended by the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention suggests a third understanding of derived 
sovereignty but does not undermine her initial 
conclusions. Accordingly, the five delegates who fall 
into this middle category view the grant of power to 
the general government as necessary to the function of 
the general government. However, they also believe 
that the Constitution does not adequately safeguard 
the rights and liberties of the American people. In 
an effort to win these delegates over and ensure 
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ratification, amendments were proposed as an addition 
to the Constitution. On the need for amendments and 
greater security, Mr. Turner says, “…for by small 
degrees has liberty, in all nations, been wrested from 
the hands of the people. I know great powers are 
necessary to be given to Congress, but I wish they may 
be well guarded” (Kaminski 2000, 1226). Mr. Turner 
understands that there is a necessity for extensive 
derived power to protect the people, but he does not 
think that there are proper checks on this power. Mr. 
Barrell adds the following:
Congress will be vested with more extensive 
powers than ever Great Britain exercised over 
us; too great, in my opinion, to entrust with 
any class of men…while we consider them as 
men of like passions, the same spontaneous, 
inherent thirst for power with ourselves, 
great and good as they may be, when they 
enter upon this all-important charge, what 
security can we have that they will continue so 
(Kaminski 2000, 1448)?
Mr. Barrell is concerned that the general government 
will abuse their power should they be awarded too 
much of it. He is worried that this could undermine the 
liberties of the people, but also that they simply cannot 
be trusted with such a broad authorization of power. 
In his understanding, political figures will inevitably 
abuse the power they were given as a result of 
holding the position. This shows his need for further 
protections from the general government which were 
not highlighted in the Constitution as it stood. 
The introduction of amendments to the 
Constitution swayed the votes of many delegates 
who were stuck in the middle in terms of derived 
sovereignty. John Hancock, President of the 
Convention says, “…if amended (as I feel assured 
it will be) according to your proposals, it cannot 
fail to give the people of the United States a greater 
degree of political freedom, and eventually as much 
national dignity, as falls to the lot of any nation on 
earth” (Kaminski 2000, 1475). Hancock was on the 
fence about the Constitution before amendments 
were added. This act swayed his vote in favor of the 
Constitution, and since he was the president of the 
convention, it is possible that many other delegates 
followed suit. Had amendments not been added to the 
Constitution, it is likely that the Constitution would 
not have been ratified in the state of Massachusetts. 
Mr. Randall also falls into this camp, saying, “…I 
think it becomes us, as wise men, as the faithful 
guardians of the people's rights, and as we wish well to 
posterity, to propose such amendments as will secure 
to us and ours that liberty without which life is a 
burden” (Kaminski 2000, 1449). Initially, Randall was 
against the Constitution as he felt it provided too much 
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derived power to the general government. However, 
with the introduction of amendments, he became more 
comfortable with the further protections of individual 
rights and freedoms of the people. With this addition, 
he is willing to vote in favor of the ratification 
of the Constitution. 
Conclusion 
The results of my research confirm those found in 
Mogg. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 
evidence points to the presence of a multidimensional 
understanding of sovereignty. The first dimension, 
principle sovereignty, focuses on the question of 
who authorizes the existence of government. Mogg 
finds that there are two formulations of principle 
sovereignty at the Convention of 1787, with the first 
locating principle sovereignty in the American people 
and the second locating it with the people of the states. 
The second dimension, derived sovereignty, focuses 
on the extent of the powers authorized by the principle 
sovereign. Here, the focus is on the nature of the grant 
of power provided to the general government by the 
Constitution.
Unlike Mogg, evidence from the 
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention suggests the 
presence of another principle sovereign, the state 
governments. While Mogg is able to show that 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
ultimately believe that the people of the states are 
the principle sovereign, there is no evidence that 
allows the delegates to the Massachusetts Convention 
advocating for confederacy to be classified similarly. 
Additionally, analysis of the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention suggest that derived sovereignty can be 
viewed beyond the strong/weak distinction employed 
by Mogg. For some delegates, the grant of power 
to the general government is adequate, but the 
safeguards protecting the rights and liberties of the 
American people are inadequate. Thus, amendments 
are recommended by the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention, which has the effect of securing 
Massachusetts’ vote for ratification. 
 While these conclusions both confirm and 
extend Mogg’s analysis, one should view the results 
presented here with caution for two reasons. First, 
the analysis presented here is based on a very small 
sample size of thirty-six classifiable delegates. 355 
delegates were in attendance at the MA convention. 
Of those 355, 66 spoke. Of those 66, 36 were 
classifiable. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the 
thirty-six delegates focused on here are representative 
of Massachusetts more generally. Second, the 
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Massachusetts’ Convention is limited in focus. There 
is hardly any discussion of the executive branch, the 
judicial branch, and many other relevant aspects 
of the Constitution. 
When combined with the analysis and 
argument of Mogg, the results presented here have 
implications for how one should consider the issue 
of sovereignty in American politics. In particular, the 
multidimensionality of sovereignty highlights the 
need for clarity. This need for clarity speaks directly 
to James Madison’s concern with the problem of 
language. In Federalist #37, Madison warns his reader 
about the problems inherent in language. He writes, 
“…The obscurity arising from the complexity of 
objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, 
the medium through which the conceptions of men are 
conveyed to each other, adds a fresh embarrassment” 
(#37: 183). Here, Madison suggests that the 
imperfection of language has the effect of rendering 
complex ideas and concepts more obscure. He writes, 
“The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been 
distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, 
by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical 
philosophers” (#37: 182). Thus, if the requisite 
precision lies beyond the capacities of the “most 
acute and metaphysical philosophers” (#37: 182), it is 
reasonable to conclude that this level of precision is 
beyond the capabilities of the people and their elected 
and unelected officials. Of all of the issues considered 
by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787, Madison highlights, “…the arduous…
task of marking the proper line of partition, between 
the authority of the general, and that of the state 
governments” (#37: 182). For Madison, it is the topic 
of sovereignty where the language available to the 
delegates proves most insufficient. Scholars working 
on this topic should give Madison’s warning the 
attention it deserves.
Finally, this study speaks to how scholars 
should approach the study of American political 
thought. Students of American political thought should 
not only pay greater attention to the state ratifying 
conventions, but they should be mindful of the fact 
that these conventions will not simply confirm or 
reject previously articulated understandings of key 
terms. While this study set out to confirm or reject 
the understanding of sovereignty identified by Mogg 
(2006), it was able to add to her understanding of 
sovereignty. This indicates that the meaning of key 
aspects of American political thought are likely 
never set in stone. Rather, they are continually being 
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reconsidered, revised, and added to by the various 
actors of the American political system. 
Notes 
1. It may be the case that the six delegates
classified here as advocating for the state governments 
possessing principle sovereignty may actually hold the 
position that the people of each state possess principle 
sovereignty. This is what Mogg finds in her analysis. 
Ultimately, the lack of any textual evidence suggesting 
that this is the case in the record of the Massachusetts 
Ratifying Convention precluded me from classifying 
these delegates as locating principle sovereignty in the 
hands of the people of the thirteen states, and rather 
placing principle sovereignty with the thirteen state 
legislatures.
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